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Abstract 
This article empirically examines and quantifies the effect of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) on three distinct aspects of the Chapter 11 process: 
a) the duration of traditional Chapter 11 cases; b) the use of prepackaged and prenegotiated 
bankruptcies; and c) debtor refiling rates.  The sample studied consists of companies with more 
than $100 million in assets that both filed for and exited Chapter 11 between 1997 and 2014.  
BAPCPA is found to be associated with shorter Chapter 11 case duration, and an increased use 
of prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies.  Additionally, BAPCPA is found to be 
associated with an increase in the proportion of firms that soon refile for bankruptcy.  It seems 
that the 2005 amendments force the debtor to emerge hastily from its Chapter 11 proceedings, 
ignoring operational and structural problems and, therefore, not achieving true rehabilitation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The consensus among scholars and practitioners has always been that the disposition of a 
Chapter 11 case takes more time than it should, producing inefficient results for both society and 
the distressed firms’ creditors.1  According to this view, distressed firms use the control that 
Chapter 11 confers to them to strategically delay the reorganization process at the expense of the 
rest of the constituencies involved.  Indeed, there are more than a few examples of debtors that 
reorganized after being dragged in Chapter 11 for several years, during which they sustained 
huge losses.2  There are also more than a few examples of debtors that merely delayed the 
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on earlier drafts of this project. I would also like to thank Professor Sean Griffith and Professor Michael Simkovic 
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1 James J. White, Harvey’s Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467, 474 (1995) (“I believe that the largest and most 
palpable costs of Chapter 11 arise from delay.[…] Chapter 11 – at least as practiced in large cases- appears to 
condone and even exaggerate delay and attendant costs.” But see Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The 
Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 626 (2009), where they characterize this 
conventional wisdom mistaken and provide data indicating that cases move forward more quickly than what it is 
believed by most scholars and practitioners. 
2 White, supra note 1, at 474, citing the LTV bankruptcy, a manufacturer that was able to confirm a plan of 
reorganization after seven years in bankruptcy, during which it sustained significant losses. 
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inevitable, which was the liquidation of their assets.3  To this delay in the resolution of Chapter 
11 cases contributed to a great extent the almost unlimited exclusivity period that the debtors 
enjoyed before the recent reform of the Bankruptcy Code.4  In particular, even though the initial 
120-day period during which the debtor had the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization 
could be extended only for cause shown,5 courts would routinely grant extensions, providing the 
debtors with the opportunity to prolong their exclusivity right for even several years.  During all 
this time, creditors were practically held hostage since they were not able to submit a competing 
plan of reorganization.   
This changed in 2005 with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act6  (hereafter, “BAPCPA”) in October 17 of the same year. One of the 
most important amendments effectuated by BAPCPA that intended to address the phenomenon 
of the protracted Chapter 11 cases mentioned above refers to the cap on the extension of the 
exclusivity period.7  By setting an upper threshold beyond which the debtors cannot be granted 
any further extension of their exclusivity right, BAPCPA aimed and succeeded at reducing the 
duration of the usually lengthy Chapter 11 cases.  Indeed, as the dataset indicates, the duration of 
traditional Chapter 11 cases in the post-BAPCPA era is reduced by 32%.8  
Correspondingly, the proportion of prepackaged and pre-negotiated bankruptcies 
increased.9 To be sure, the latter was expected as a consequence of not only the exclusivity 
extension cap placed by BAPCPA, but of another important 2005 amendment as well: the 
reduced time within which the debtor can decide whether to assume or reject commercial leases 
in which the debtor is the lessee.10  Under the pre-BAPCPA regime, and similarly with the 
previous status quo regarding the extension of the exclusivity period, the timeframe within which 
the debtor had to reach a decision as to whether to assume or reject commercial leases would 
stretch almost indefinitely.  BAPCPA, therefore, came to put an end to this practice by setting a 
maximum extension of 210 days that can be extended only with the prior written consent of the 
lessor.11  
From the above, it is obvious that the post-2005 debtor is under pressure to exit Chapter 
11 faster than before, making pre-bankruptcy planning seem essential. Indeed, the results of my 
study indicate that BAPCPA is negatively correlated at a statistically significant level with 
Chapter 11 case duration, meaning that post-BAPCPA reorganization cases tend to be resolved 
more quickly. At the same time, BAPCPA is positively correlated at a statistically significant 
level with prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies, suggesting that an increased proportion 
of companies engage in negotiations before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. This increase in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See id. 
4 This reform refers to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act in 2005. 
5 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (before the enactment of the 2005 Act). 
6 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
7 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (as amended by BAPCPA). 
8 Infra Table 1. 
9 Infra Table 3. 
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (d) (4). 
11 Id. (emphasis added). 
3	  
	  
the proportion of preplanned cases can be additionally attributed to the enactment of §§ 1125 (g) 
and 341 (e) as part of BAPCPA, which further facilitated the use of this type of bankruptcies. 
While shorter Chapter 11s, and preplanned cases entail lower costs for the debtor, they 
have been linked with higher refiling rates. Therefore, and as anticipated as a consequence of the 
less time spent in bankruptcy and the increased proportion of pre-planned cases, BAPCPA is also 
positively associated at a statistically significant level with refiling rates, a finding that suggests 
that the 2005 amendments force the debtor to ignore operational problems and hastily attempt to 
emerge from its Chapter 11 proceedings.  
This article is divided into three parts: Part I reviews §§ 1121 and 365 of the Bankruptcy 
Code and compares the relevant regimes before and after BAPCPA took effect. Reference is also 
made to §§ 1125 (g) and 341 (e). Part II sets forth the hypotheses and literature review. Part III 
uses multivariate regression models, and demonstrates that post-2005 Chapter 11 reorganization 
cases are disposed of more quickly. Additionally, the effect of BAPCPA on the increase of 
prepackaged and pre-negotiated bankruptcies is quantified. The refiling rate problem associated 
with speedy and pre-planned bankruptcies is also examined. Finally, Part IV contains the 
conclusion and further research questions. 
 
I. BAPCPA AND SHORTENED CHAPTER 11 TIMEFRAME  
 Lengthy Chapter 11 cases were never desirable, but always present. Indeed, one of the 
main complaints against Chapter 11 has been that it allows debtors to drag on their cases for 
several years at the expense of their creditors.  BAPCPA attempted to put a stop to these 
protracted cases by amending two important sections of the Bankruptcy Code, namely § 1121 
and § 365, and placing an upper time-limit after which the debtor has no other option than to 
accelerate its case.   
In order to be better able to evaluate these two amendments, one has to trace the 
predecessor-provisions’ implementation over time, and consider the reasoning underlying their 
enactment, which was no other than the facilitation of the survival and rehabilitation of the 
financially distressed business. Indeed, the House Report accompanying the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Reform Act tips the balance in favor of reorganization by stating that unlike a liquidation case 
“[t]he purpose of a business reorganization case …  is to restructure a business's finances so that 
it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a 
return for its stockholders.”12  This central premise of Chapter 11 has been promoted by case law 
as well: for example, in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,13 the Supreme Court stated that “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 H.REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6179. 
13 465 U.S. 513 (1984). 
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fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with 
the attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.”14  
Within this general context of encouraging and promoting reorganization, the Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978 included § 1121. This provision attempts to reconcile two competing interests: 
these of the debtor and those of its creditors. In particular, § 1121 equips the debtor’s 
management with a very important tool designed to give the debtor control over the Chapter 11 
case and facilitate the formulation of a viable operating plan: namely, it provides the debtor with 
the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization for 120 days after bankruptcy commences.15  If 
the debtor eventually files a plan of reorganization within the exclusivity period, then it is 
afforded an additional 60-day period to solicit acceptances.16 This level of control over the 
reorganization proceeding offered pursuant to § 1121 was intended to operate as a “carrot” for 
debtors in order to file timely for Chapter 11.17  Additionally, providing for an exclusivity period 
is necessary to ensure that the distressed debtor is given long enough time to formulate a plan of 
reorganization without having to address at the same time competing plans submitted by 
creditors interested only in repayment of their debt. Indeed, one would expect that from all the 
constituencies involved in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor is the one with the greatest interest and 
in the best position to craft a plan that provides for the continuation of the company as a going 
concern.18  Therefore, it is only natural that the debtor is given the unfettered and exclusive right, 
at least for a period of time, to file a plan of reorganization.  
In addition to recognizing this need of the debtor to remain in control of the Chapter 11 
case as long as possible, § 1121 acknowledges that there are creditor interests that should be 
taken into account and protected as well.19  It is for this reason that § 1121 provides that both the 
debtor’s exclusivity and acceptance solicitation periods can extend beyond the initial 120 and 60 
days respectively, but only for cause.20  
However, before the enactment of the 2005 amendments, this granting of exclusivity 
extensions was abused. Namely, consecutive requests for extension of the exclusivity period 
were routinely approved, dragging the exclusivity right for maybe several years. As one 
commentator notes, the exclusivity period merely operated as a “120-day “grace period” after the 
commencement of the case during which management need not21 file a plan.”22  In support of 
this argument, Lynn LoPucki and William Whitford, in an empirical study that explored 
corporate governance issues in reorganization cases of large, publicly held companies that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Id. at 528; see also In re Ionosphere Clubs Inc., 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) where it is emphasized that: 
“the paramount policy and goal of chapter 11, to which all other policies are subordinated…, [which] is the 
rehabilitation of the debtor.” 
15 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (b). 
16 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (c) (3).	  
17 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 231-232. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 231-232. 
“Proposed Chapter 11 recognizes the need for the debtor to remain in control to some degree, or else debtors will 
avoid the reorganization provisions in the bill until it would be too late for them to be an effective remedy.” 
18 J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 213, 294 (1991). 
19 Id. 
20 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (d) (1) (emphasis added).  
21 Emphasis added. 
22 Johnston, supra note 19, at 293. 
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confirmed a plan of reorganization before March 15, 1998, found that the exclusivity period was 
extended in 79% of the cases studied.23  As a result, even though the exclusivity period was 
initially intended to be a value-maximization mechanism that would allow the debtor to craft a 
plan that would ensure the viability of the company, it ended up defeating its purpose and 
placing the creditors at a huge disadvantage as their hands were tied up until the debtor 
eventually decided to propose a reorganization plan.24  
Addressing this abuse of the exclusivity period extension, BAPCPA amended § 1121 so 
as to unequivocally set forth the maximum period within which the debtor will have the 
exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization.  In particular, pursuant to the 2005 amendments, § 
1121 was modified so as to provide that any increases in the duration of the exclusivity period 
cannot exceed 18 months,25 while the period for solicitation of acceptances of the plan cannot 
extend beyond 20 months after the date of the order for relief.26   
The other amendment at issue, that of § 365, that refers to the timeframe within which the 
debtor may assume or reject leases in which the debtor is the lessee was triggered by the same 
concerns surrounding § 1121 as the latter stood before its amendment by BAPCPA.  Under 
former § 365, the initial 60-day deadline that was available to the debtor-lessor to decide whether 
to keep or discard a commercial lease could be extended for cause.27  These extensions, however, 
similarly with what used to happen under former § 1121, were provided to the debtor routinely, 
stretching the corresponding deadline almost indefinitely.28  The logic behind this was that 
debtors, especially retailers that may have to make decisions about a vast number of leases 
nationwide, needed this extended time in order to ensure the assumption of the beneficial to their 
reorganization efforts leases, and rejection of the unnecessary, or even harmful, ones.  The 
importance of this decision was intensified by the fact that a premature assumption of a lease 
could lead to its subsequent rejection, an action that would entitle the landlord to administrative 
expense priority for the entire post-petition rent owed.29 
After the enactment of the 2005 amendments, the assumption and subsequent rejection of 
a commercial lease by the debtor-lessee provides the landlord again with administrative priority 
for the post-petition rent, but the amount of this expense is capped.  In particular, the landlord is 
entitled to administrative expense priority for the amount of rent owed for two years following 
the later of the rejection date or the date of the premises turnover.30  This provision was likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, 
Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 669, 693 (1993) (“The bankruptcy judge extended exclusivity for the 
duration of the reorganization case for thirty-four of the forty-three companies we studied.”). 
24 Johnston, supra note 19, at 294. See also id. LoPucki et al, where the authors explain how this delay in filing a 
reorganization plan imposes costs and adversely affects creditors. 
25 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2) (A).  
26 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2) (B). 
27 11 U.S.C. § 365 (d) (before the enactment of BAPCPA). 
28 Ira L. Herman, Statutory Schizophrenia and the New Chapter 11, 25-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 92 (2007). 
29 See David R. Kuney, Protecting the Landlord’s Recent Claim in Bankruptcy: Letter of Credit and Other Issues, 
SUO48 ALI-ABA 811 (June 6-8 2013), (“… prior to BAPCPA, case law had generally supported the notion that if a 
debtor assumes a lease, and then later “breaches” or rejects the lease, all of the damages are entitled to an 
administrative priority payment.”).	  
30 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b) (7). 
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enacted to counterweigh the fact that post-2005 § 365 forces debtors to reach faster a decision as 
to which leases to assume or reject.  In particular, amended § 365 provides for an initial 120-day 
deadline, which can be extended for cause for another 90 days. For any extension further than 
this total 210-day period, the prior written consent of the landlord is necessary.31  It is, therefore, 
obvious that the virtually unlimited assumption/rejection period that the debtors enjoyed before 
BAPCPA has given way to a 210-day period whose further extension depends upon the 
landlord’s will. 
These two provisions analyzed above and the cap they placed on the plan exclusivity and 
lease assumption/rejection regimes respectively, along with the rest of the BAPCPA 
amendments, have been the subject of much debate over their effect on the debtor’s 
reorganization chances.32  However, setting aside this debate, it must be acknowledged that 
modified §§ 1121 and 365 forced Chapter 11 cases to resolve more quickly than in the past. 
Indeed, as the data show, BAPCPA was able to put a halt to the rather protracted Chapter 11 
cases of the past by reducing the length of traditional reorganization cases by 32%.33 
Within this general tendency and desire for quicker Chapter 11 cases, BAPCPA further 
fostered the use of prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies.  Prepackaged and prenegotiated 
cases entail pre-filing negotiations between the debtor and its creditors.  The difference between 
these two types of preplanned cases is that in prepackaged bankruptcies creditors vote on the 
plan before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, while in prenegotiated bankruptcies plan voting 
is conducted post-petition according to “plan support agreements” that have been previously 
negotiated between the debtor and its significant stakeholders.34  Naturally, these preplanned 
cases are resolved much more quickly compared to traditional Chapter 11s, and entail lower 
costs.  Through the enactment of §§ 1125 (g) and 341 (e), BAPCPA further facilitated this type 
of cases and, therefore, made them even more attractive than they were in the past. 
In particular, according to § 1125 (b), an acceptance or rejection of the plan cannot be 
solicited after the commencement of the Chapter 11 case absent a court-approved disclosure 
statement.35 As a result, under the pre-BAPCPA regime, any pre-petition solicitation, as well as 
the mere signing of plan support agreements, that was completed after the filing of the Chapter 
11 petition without a court-approved disclosure statement could be deemed to be in violation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 11 U.S.C. § 365 (d) (4). 
32 For a more detailed discussion on exclusivity see, e.g., Kara Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L. 
J. 174,202 (2012); Jeffrey M. Schlerf, BAPCPA’s Impact on Exclusivity Is Hard to Gauge (July, 2007) available at: 
http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=7797. See also Foteini Teloni, The Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: An Empirical Examination of the Act’s Business Bankruptcy 
Effects, 88 AM. BANKR. L. J. 237 (2014), showing a positive and statistically significant relationship between the 
2005 amendments and the pre-plan sale of the debtor’s all or substantially all assets. 
33 Infra Table 1.	  
34 See Kurt A. Mayr, Unlocking the Lockup: The Revival of Plan Support Agreements under New § 1125(g) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 6 ART. 1 (2006).  
35 11 U.S.C.§ 1125 (b). 
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§1125 (b) and result to the subsequent designation of those votes.36  This changed with the 
enactment of § 1125 (g) in 2005.  Specifically, new § 1125 (g) reads that: 
                        “notwithstanding subsection (b), an acceptance or rejection of the plan 
may be solicited from a holder of a claim or interest if such 
solicitation complies with applicable nonbankruptcy law and if such 
holder was solicited before37 the commencement of the case in a 
manner complying with applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 
Provided, therefore, that the requirements of subsection (g) are met, the debtor can commence 
the solicitation process before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition and complete it post-petition 
even before there is a court-approved disclosure statement.38 
Furthermore, the enactment of § 341 (e) as part of BAPCPA provides the judge the 
flexibility to order the U.S. trustee not to convene a creditors meeting, something that was 
required in every case under the pre-BAPCPA regime,39 if the debtor was able to solicit 
acceptances before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition.40  The rationale behind this is that the 
debtor has already negotiated and solicited acceptances from a sufficient number of creditors, 
and, therefore, a creditor meeting would only unnecessarily delay the process.41 
 
II. HYPOTHESES AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. HYPOTHESES  
This study aims to empirically examine several different hypotheses relating to 
BAPCPA’s enactment.  In particular this study will quantify BAPCPA’s effect on the duration of 
Chapter 11 cases, the use of prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies, as well as the debtor 
refiling rates.  
As described above, the cap on the exclusivity extension greatly limited the debtor’s 
ability to prolong the reorganization process by precluding its creditors from filing their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See, e.g., In re NII Holdings Inc., No. 02-11505 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 22, 2002); In re Stations Holding 
Co., Inc., No. 02-10882 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 25, 2002).	  
37 Emphasis added. 
38 See James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Need for Speed: Utilizing Hybrid Solicitation Strategies to Shorten Ch. 11 
Cases, 24 BBLR 1351 (2012), also available at: 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/BloombergBNA_Oct%202012.pdf. The authors cite the 
prenegotiated case of Reddy Ice Inc., which was completed within 36 days from filing. The debtor, Reddy Ice, 
utilizing § 1125 (g), was able to commence the solicitation process before the filing of the petition and complete it 
post-petition without having to wait for the approval of a disclosure statement, shortening, therefore, its Chapter 11 
case significantly.  
39 11.U.S.C. § 341 (a), (b). 
40 11 U.S.C. § 341 (e): “Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the court, on the request of a party in interest and 
after a notice and a hearing, for cause may order that the United States trustee not convene a meeting of creditors or 
equity security holders if the debtor has filed a plan as to which the debtor solicited acceptances prior to the 
commencement of the case.”  
41 See Hon. Brian K. Tester et al., Need for Speed: Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Bankruptcy Plans, ABI 17th 
Annual Northeast Bankruptcy Conference, 511, 520-521 (2010). 
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competing plans. Additionally, the debtor company now has less time to sort out which 
commercial leases to assume or reject, a strategic decision that can enhance the debtor’s 
reorganization chances.  I, therefore, expect to find a statistically significant difference in the 
duration of Chapter 11 cases for the periods before and after BAPCPA.  In particular, I expect to 
observe shorter Chapter 11 cases in the post-2005 era.   
This shortened timeframe within which Chapter 11 cases are resolved following the 
enactment of the 2005 amendments may have caused distressed companies to engage in 
extensive pre-bankruptcy planning.  As a result, a rise in prepackaged and pre-negotiated 
bankruptcies is anticipated as well. Additionally, and as mentioned above, this increase in 
prepackaged bankruptcies is also expected as a result of the enactment of §§ 1125 (g) and 341 
(e). 
Quick resolution of Chapter 11 cases is undoubtedly beneficial: the debtor incurs lower 
costs, and is able to return to normal operations much faster, avoiding the reputational harm that 
a prolonged stay in Chapter 11 might imply.  However, quick resolution of Chapter 11 cases 
could have negative consequences as well, as, according to previous research, less time in 
reorganization is associated with higher refiling rates.42  Therefore, I additionally expect to 
observe a higher refiling rate for companies that filed for Chapter 11 after the enactment of the 
2005 amendments.  Indeed, the quick resolution of Chapter 11 cases, particularly through the 
implementation of prepackaged reorganizations, might imply that operational problems of the 
company have been ignored in favor of a swift confirmation of a reorganization plan that focuses 
solely on the firm’s financial restructuring. It follows that the company emerges quickly from its 
Chapter 11, but not truly rehabilitated, incurring, therefore, a greater risk to seek again 
bankruptcy protection.43 
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The duration of Chapter 11 cases, the increased use of prepackaged and prenegotiated 
bankruptcies, as well as the debtors’ refiling rates, have all been the subject of several empirical 
scholarly articles.   
Indeed, from the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 
1978 and its subsequent amendment by BAPCPA in 2005, the length of reorganization cases has 
always been an issue of concern. Several studies have explored whether the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 achieved its objective of shorter cases compared to the pre-Code 
regime.  Later studies have presented empirical evidence indicating a general tendency over the 
years in favor of shorter as well as prepackaged bankruptcies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Lynn M. Lopucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing? 
55 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1976 (2002). 
43 See Mike Spector, The Quickie Bankruptcy: More Companies Enter Court, and Exit, in a Flash, Wall Street 
Journal (January 5, 2010), available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052748704789404574636164199387026, quoting William Snyder 
who was involved in the Pilgrim Pride’s bankruptcy.  
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More specifically, in his paper, Evaluating the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy-Reorganization 
Process,44 Edward Altman evaluated the effect of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 on the 
reorganization process fifteen years following its enactment. The author underlined as one of the 
important objectives of the Bankruptcy Code enactment the faster resolution of reorganization 
cases.45  Within this context, Professor Altman’s study found that post-1978 the average time in 
reorganization shortened, though still remained long.  In particular, the author found that under 
the pre-Code era the average time between the petition date and the confirmation date was 27 
months, while under the Bankruptcy Code the average period was 21 months.46  
 Using data from other studies, Lynn LoPucki showed a 150% increase from 1964 to 
1987 in the median time companies spent in Chapter 11, but found that the median time that 
large, public companies spent in Chapter 11 did not increase during that same period.47  Instead, 
the enactment of Chapter 11 had an impact only on smaller cases, whose time in Chapter 11 
proceedings doubled. 
In their article, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large, 
Chapter 11 Reorganizations, Theodore Eisenberg and Lynn LoPucki observed that the mean 
time to confirmation or sale of assets has been decreasing over time.  In particular, the authors 
found that while the mean time to confirmation or asset sale for unnegotiated cases was 1400 
days in 1981, it fell to approximately 400 days in 1997.48  Additionally, the authors underlined 
an increase in the use of prepackaged bankruptcies during that same period.49  
Similarly, Bermant et al., studied the choice of venue of large public companies that 
emerged from Chapter 11 during 1994 and 1995 and found, among other things, that cases filed 
in Delaware tend to be resolved more quickly than cases filed elsewhere,50 a result also 
supported by LoPucki and Doherty’s research.51  Within the same context, in a later study, 
Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn examined a nationwide sample of Chapter 11 cases of all sizes 
from 1989 to 1997.  In that study, the authors observed that intervals from filing to confirmation 
have reduced and that there is a clear trend toward faster resolution of Chapter 11 cases.52  
Additionally, it has been shown that shorter Chapter 11 duration is associated with the 
debtor’s securing post-petition (DIP) financing.53  In particular, Dahiya et al. found that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
45 Id. at 2.  At this point it should be noted that Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the debtors enjoyed an unlimited 
exclusivity right. As a result, Chapter 11 cases were extremely lengthy. The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 addressed 
this issue by placing for a first time a limit on the debtor’s exclusivity right.	  
46 Id. at 3.  
47 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729 (1993). 
48 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 980 (1998-1999).	  
49 Id. at 981. 
50 Gordon Bermant et al., Chapter 11 Venue Choice by Large Public Companies: Report to the Judicial Conference 
Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System, Federal Judicial Center 1997. 
51 Lynn LoPucki et al., supra note 42, at 1964,1965. 
52 Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases: U.S. Trustee Database Sheds New Light on Old Questions, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/abi98febnumbers.html (1998). 
53 Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-In-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 
Journal of Financial Economics 259, 274 (2003). See also Fayez A. Elayan & Thomas O. Meyer, The Impact of 
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companies that were able to secure DIP financing were led to emergence or liquidation more 
quickly compared to those that proceeded without such financing. As the authors argue, DIP 
lenders help the company emerge from bankruptcy by investing in positive net present value 
projects, however, if things do not go well, these lenders do not hesitate to quickly liquidate the 
debtor in order to salvage as much value as possible.54 
A more recent study that examined Chapter 11 duration trends from January 1, 2008, to 
December 31, 2012 for companies with assets of at least $250 million found that Chapter 11 
cases filed in late 2012 resolved at a faster pace than those filed in early 2008.55  This quicker 
resolution is attributed by the authors to the consistently increasing proportion of prepackaged 
and prenegotiated bankruptcies.56 
This fast resolution of Chapter 11 cases has proven to carry costs for the debtor, 
translated into repeated bankruptcy filings.  In their article, Why are Delaware and New York 
Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?,57  Professors LoPucki and Doherty studied a sample of 
large, public Chapter 11 debtors that also emerged from reorganization as public companies 
between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 1996.  Among the various results of their study, the 
authors observed a positive and statistically significant relationship between speed of 
reorganization and refiling.58  Furthermore, the data showed that firms emerging from the 
generally speedy Delaware Chapter 11 bankruptcies during that period were more likely to refile 
than companies emerging from other jurisdictions’ reorganizations.59  
Thus far, however, there has been no study exploring the effect of BAPCPA on Chapter 
11 duration, pre-planned cases, and debtor refilings. Therefore, this article aims to add to the 
existing literature, summarized above, by exploring how the 2005 amendments have affected the 
aforementioned issues. The following sections analyze the methodology followed in the present 
study and set forth the results. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
A. DURATION AND PRE-PLANNED CASES IN THE POST-2005 ERA  
i. Methodology 
a. Sample Selection and Univariate Analyses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Receiving Debtor-in-Possession Financing on the Probability of Successful Emergence and Time Spent Under 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 28(7) & (8) (2001). 
54Dahiya et al., supra note 53, at 261.. 
55 Dennis A. Meloro et al., The Fast and Laborious: Chapter 11 Case Trends, ABI JOURNAL (March 2013). 
56 Id. The results of the study showed a 20% increase from 2008 to 2012 in the proportion of prepackaged and 
prenegotiated cases. See also Hon. Brian K. Tester et al., Need for Speed: Prepackaged and Prenegotiated 
Bankruptcy Plans, ABI 17th Annual Northeast Bankruptcy Conference, 511, 512 (2010). (mentioning that 
prepackaged bankruptcies “hit an 8-year high in the first quarter of 2009.”). 
57 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 42. 
58 Id. at 1977.	  
59 Id. at 1939. 
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The starting point of this study is the examination of the effect of BAPCPA on the length 
of traditional Chapter 11 cases as well as the increased proportion of prepackaged and 
prenegotiated bankruptcies. To this end, a sample of large public companies (excluding finance, 
insurance, and real estate companies) that both filed for and exited Chapter 11 between 1997 and 
2014 by confirming a plan60 was extracted from the UCLA –LoPucki Bankruptcy Research 
Database (hereafter, “BRD”).61 Pre-plan sales of the debtor’s all or substantially all assets were 
excluded from the sample. The duration of each case is calculated as the number of days that 
came between the filing date and the confirmation date. The plan confirmation dates were not 
available for all companies. Further, the initial sample was reduced to include only those 
companies for which financial data for either the last or second-to-last fiscal year before 
bankruptcy were available in Compustat.62 As a result, the final sample consisted of a total of 
390 companies.  
For the total of 390 companies, data regarding the type of bankruptcy (i.e. whether it was 
a prepackaged or prenegotiatied case, or a “free-fall” reorganization case), duration, and the 
filing venue were gathered from the BRD.   
With the aim to gain an initial insight into BAPCPA’s effect on the duration of Chapter 
11 cases, as well as the use of pre-planned bankruptcies, univariate tests were employed.  
First, in Table 1, we observe that the duration mean for the sample of traditional Chapter 
11 cases dropped from 634 days in the pre-BAPCPA period to 430 days in the post-BAPCPA 
period.  As anticipated, this decrease is also statistically significant, as the two-tail t-test 
indicates, with a p-value less than 1%. Therefore, the null hypothesis, that there is no difference 
between the duration means before and after BAPCPA, can be safely rejected. 
 As also anticipated, this shortened timeframe within which post-2005 Chapter 11 cases 
have to be resolved, along with the more flexible stance that BAPCPA took towards preplanned 
cases, has caused distressed companies to engage in extensive pre-bankruptcy planning, and 
therefore we observe a rise in prepackaged and pre-negotiated bankruptcies as well. Indeed, as 
Table 3 indicates, following the enactment of the 2005 amendments there has been a statistically 
significant increase in the proportion of preplanned bankruptcy cases. In particular, the 
proportion of prepackaged and pre-negotiated bankruptcies as of the total number of cases of the 
sample rose to 58% after 2005, which is 23 percentage points higher than before BAPCPA.  
Additionally, what is interesting to note is that the mean duration for preplanned cases 
has dropped in the post-2005 era as well.63  This decrease, which is statistically significant at the 
10% level, could result from the fact that, pursuant to new § 1125 (g), as discussed above, the 
debtor can expedite even more its preplanned case by commencing the solicitation process 
before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition and completing it post-petition prior to a court-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The plan confirmed could be a plan of reorganization or a liquidation plan.  Plan sales were included.	  
61 The BRD includes companies with assets of $100 million or more that filed under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy 
code. These companies must have also filed a 10-K form with the Securities Exchange Commission, for a year 
ending not less than three years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case. 
62 Compustat is a database that provides financial data for companies worldwide and is available through the 
Wharton Research Data Services.  Not all financial data are available for all companies. 
63 Infra Table 1. 
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approved disclosure statement.64 Furthermore, the enactment of § 341 (e) as part of BAPCPA, 
which dispenses with the need to convene a creditor meeting if the debtor was able to solicit 
acceptances before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition,65 shortens even more the time to 
confirmation.66 
 From the aforementioned, it is obvious that BAPCPA has laid the ground for shorter 
Chapter 11 cases and more preplanned bankruptcies. In order, however, to reach accurate 
conclusions regarding BAPCPA’s specific effect on these two aspects of the Chapter 11 process, 
additional factors should be taken into account. The two subsections that follow describe the 
multivariate regression models used to empirically examine BAPCPA’s effect on the 
aforementioned topics, and present the results of the studies. 
 
b. Regression Models and Variable Selection 
As mentioned above, the initial purpose of this study is to empirically examine and 
quantify the effect that the 2005 amendments had on the faster resolution of Chapter 11 cases as 
well as on the increased use of prepackaged and pre-negotiated bankruptcies. A simple 
inspection of Tables 1 and 2 suggests that post-2005 Chapter 11 cases tend to be resolved more 
quickly, while Table 3 shows that post-2005 there has been an increase in the percentage of 
prepackaged and pre-negotiated bankruptcies by almost 2/3 of its previous value. However, in 
order to control for factors other than BAPCPA that might have affected the length of Chapter 11 
cases as well as the proportion of pre-planned reorganizations, multivariate regression models 
are used. 
The dependent variable in the first regression model is “duration.” As stated before, the 
duration for cases that ended in the confirmation of a plan is measured in days, and was 
calculated as the difference between the filing date and the plan confirmation date.67   
 The independent variables included in this regression model are the categorical variables 
of BAPCPA, economic recession, prepackaged and prenegotiated cases, and filing venue. In 
particular, the following categorical variables are included in the regression: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Need for Speed: Utilizing Hybrid Solicitation Strategies to Shorten Ch. 11 
Cases, 24 BBLR 1351 (2012), also available at: 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/BloombergBNA_Oct%202012.pdf. The authors cite the 
prenegotiated case of Reddy Ice Inc., which was completed within 36 days from filing. The debtor, Reddy Ice, 
utilizing § 1125 (g), was able to commence the solicitation process before the filing of the petition and complete it 
post-petition without having to wait for the approval of a disclosure statement, shortening, therefore, its Chapter 11 
case significantly.  
65 11 U.S.C. § 341 (e): “Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the court, on the request of a party in interest and 
after a notice and a hearing, for cause may order that the United States trustee not convene a meeting of creditors or 
equity security holders if the debtor has filed a plan as to which the debtor solicited acceptances prior to the 
commencement of the case.”  
66 See Hon. Brian K. Tester et al., supra note 41, at 520-521.  
67 See supra Part III Section A (i) (a). The data for duration were drawn from the BRD. 
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• BAPCPA: a categorical variable that takes the value of 1 if the company filed for Chapter 
11 on or after October 17, 2005 (BAPCPA’s effective date), and 0 if a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy was filed before the aforementioned date. 
	  
• Economic Recession: a categorical variable that takes the value of 1 if the company filed 
for Chapter 11 within a period of recession, and 0 if not. In the present sample this 
categorical variable takes the value 1 if the Chapter 11 case was filed either between 
March 2001 and November 2001, or December 2007 and June 2009. 	  
 
• Prepackaged & Prenegotiated Bankruptcies: a categorical variable that takes the value of 
1 if the case was a prepackaged or pre-negotiated bankruptcy, and 0 otherwise. As 
mentioned before, in both types of these bankruptcies, a plan of reorganization is 
negotiated between the debtor and its creditors in advance of the filing of the Chapter 11 
petition.68  Therefore, prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies tend to proceed 
swiftly, allowing the debtor-company to exit bankruptcy much faster compared to a 
traditional reorganization process.69   
 
• Filing Venue: a categorical variable that is 1 if the Chapter 11 petition was filed in 
Delaware, and 0 if the petition was filed anywhere else. The assumption is that the 
Delaware bankruptcy court, as the venue that deals consistently with complex and large 
Chapter 11 cases, is more experienced in handling reorganization cases and, therefore, is 
able to resolve these cases expeditiously.70 
 
Additionally, the regression model controls for the companies’ prefiling financial profile, 
including leverage, liquidity, and profitability. More specifically the following independent 
variables are also controlled for in the regression model: total assets-to-total liabilities; current 
assets-to-current liabilities; and EBIT-to-total assets. Finally, the companies’ size (“firm size”), 
calculated as the logarithm of the book value of the firm’s prefiling assets, is used as a proxy for 
measuring the complexity of the case. All financial data were drawn from Compustat and 
correspond to the last or second-to-last fiscal year before bankruptcy. 
 The second regression model explores BAPCPA’s impact on prepackaged and pre-
negotiated bankruptcies. The dependent variable, “prepackaged & prenegotiated bankruptcies,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See Hon. Brian K. Tester et al., supra note 41. 
69 Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 48, at 979, where, describing changes in the case-processing times, they note 
that “[t]his processing-time pattern is itself complicated by increasing use of prepackaged bankruptcies, which 
reduces case-processing time.”.  
70 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 42, at 1965, observing that non-prepackaged Delaware cases were completed 
in 454 days, faster than the rest of the jurisdictions studied. The same holds for prepackaged bankruptcies as well. 
See also David Skeel, What’s So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 327 (2001), characterizing Delaware 
reorganization cases as “notably fast.” 
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is categorical, and, therefore, takes the value of 1 if the case was a prepackaged or pre-negotiated 
bankruptcy, and 0 otherwise. Since this time the dependent variable captures only two states of 
the world, i.e. can either happen or not, a logistic regression model is used. 
The independent variables included in the second regression model are the following: 
• BAPCPA: similarly with above, this variable is a categorical variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the bankruptcy case was filed after the enactment of BAPCPA, and 0 otherwise. 
 
• Filing Venue: Previous research suggests that Delaware attracts a greater proportion of 
prepackaged cases.71  To control, therefore, for this possibility, a categorical variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the Chapter 11 case was filed in Delaware, and 0 if it was filed 
anywhere else was included in the regression. 
Finally, and similarly with above, ratios measuring the company’s pre-filing leverage, liquidity, 
and profitability were taken into consideration. More specifically, the following variables were 
included in the regression model: total assets-to-total liabilities; current assets-to-current 
liabilities; and EBIT-to-total assets. The firm’s size (“firm size”), calculated as the logarithm of 
the book value of total assets, is used once again as a proxy for case complexity.72  
c. Results 
Table 4 displays the results of the multivariate regression regarding BAPCPA’s effect on 
Chapter 11 duration. 
 Initially, we observe a strong correlation between the firm’s size and the duration of its 
Chapter 11 case.  As the coefficient’s sign indicates, larger firms are likely to spend more time in 
reorganization proceedings. Considering the firm’s size is a proxy for case complexity as 
companies with more assets are likely to have numerous classes of creditors, the result of the 
regression is consistent with the notion that big Chapter 11 cases need time to resolve and 
untangle their financial affairs. 
Furthermore, we observe that the EBIT-to-total assets ratio is correlated at a statistically 
significant level of 5% with a longer time in reorganization proceedings. This result could be 
interpreted as indicating that stronger firms are better able to prolong their stay in the 
reorganization process, and undergo the in-depth restructuring necessary to allow them to 
operate profitably as soon as they emerge from their Chapter 11. Within this context, Kenneth 
Ayotte and David Skeel argue that the prospective performance of a company might very well 
affect its decision to undergo a quick or more elaborate restructuring. In particular, Ayotte & 
Skeel argued that a debtor-company predicting that it will have a poor post-emergence 
performance might initially choose a quick and, therefore, cheap restructuring, since undertaking 
the additional costs of a lengthy reorganization might not be the most efficient choice at that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 48, at 979, 981.  
72 Once again, all financial data were drawn from Compustat and correspond to the last or second-to-last fical year 
before bankruptcy. 
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time.73  Therefore, companies with gloomy projections regarding their future performance are 
more likely to opt for a quick reorganization and postpone for a subsequent point of time a more 
intensive one.74   On the other hand, stronger companies are more likely to choose to undergo a 
lengthier Chapter 11 that will allow them to deal with all operational and structural problems, 
mitigating the risk of a subsequent bankruptcy filing. 
  
Additionally, the “prepackaged and prenegotiated” variable is strongly correlated, as 
expected, with less time in bankruptcy.  As mentioned above, in prepackaged bankruptcies a plan 
has been negotiated upon and votes have been solicited before the filing event.  It follows that 
time in bankruptcy, as well as costs, are sharply reduced. The same effect holds for prenegotiated 
bankruptcies, even though generally these are slower compared to the pre-packaged ones as 
votes are solicited after the filing of a Chapter 11 petition. 
 
Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this article, and consistent with the 
univariate results presented above, the BAPCPA variable is correlated with a decrease in time 
within reorganization at a statistically significant level of 1%. Indeed, the post-2005 era is 
characterized by shorter Chapter 11 cases; fewer days come between the filing of the petition and 
the confirmation of the plan. This, of course, is indicative of the fact that the cap in the 
exclusivity extension period75 along with the shortened timeframe within which the debtor can 
decide whether to assume or reject unexpired commercial leases76 achieved their purpose of 
quicker Chapter 11 cases.  
Moving forward, Table 5 displays the results of the multivariate regression model when 
“prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies” is the dependent variable.   
As anticipated, BAPCPA is correlated with the increased use of this type of bankruptcy 
cases at the statistically significant level of 1%.  It seems that after the enactment of the 2005 
amendments debtors engage in pre-bankruptcy planning in order to ensure that they will be able 
to meet the shorter deadlines set forth by the new statute.   
Additionally, we observe that the total assets-to-total liabilities ratio is negatively 
correlated with the occurrence of pre-planned bankruptcies at the statistically significant level of 
1%.  More specifically, and as the sign of the ratio indicates, the more leveraged the company is, 
the more likely it is for a prepackaged or prenegotiated Chapter 11 to take place. Indeed, as 
previous research has shown, “full-blown” Chapter 11 firms are less leveraged than prepackaged 
bankruptcies and out-of-court restructurings.77  That empirical finding was aligned with the 
argument made by Michael Jensen that firms with higher levels of debt have an incentive to 
undergo an out-of-court restructuring, because, in that case, a greater value is compromised if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization 
Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 441 (2006)). 	  
74 Id.	  As the authors characteristically note: “The more likely the firm is to fail, the greater are the gains to waiting 
before attempting a full restructuring of operations.”.	  
75 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (d) (2) (A). 
76 11 U.S.C. § 365 (d) (4). 
77 See Sris Chatterjee at al., Coercive Tender and Exchange Offers in Distressed High-Yield Debt Restructurings: An 
Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 38, 333 (1995).  
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firm goes into bankruptcy.78  In particular, Jensen argues that a highly leveraged company that is 
unable to service its debt is also more likely to be worth much more than its liquidation value. 
Therefore, he continues, this greater value would be better preserved by avoiding the 
cumbersome bankruptcy proceeding in favor of a quicker and cheaper out-of-court restructuring. 
 Another variable that seems to be strongly affecting the dependent variable of 
“prepackaged & prenegotiated” cases is “firm size,” which is used as a proxy for case 
complexity. This independent variable is correlated with pre-planned Chapter 11s at the 
statistically significant level of 1%, and, according to the coefficient sign, the more complex the 
case is, the less likely it is for a prepackaged or prenegotiated bankruptcy to take place.  Such a 
result was anticipated.  Indeed, prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies are based on 
negotiations that culminate in consensus before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition.  Such a 
consensus is naturally easier to be achieved when there are only few creditors that hold most of 
the company’s debt to negotiate with. 
Lastly, the “filing venue” variable is in the direction expected, as the Delaware 
bankruptcy court deals with a greater proportion of prepackaged and prenegotiated cases 
compared to other courts, but not statistically significant.  
  
B. REFILINGS IN THE POST-2005 ERA 
i. Methodology 
a. Sample Selection and Univariate Analysis 
Notwithstanding the advantage of lower bankruptcy costs that accompany a speedy 
reorganization or a preplanned case, such bankruptcies usually entail cost for the debtor as the 
likelihood of a repeated filing increases.  
Refiling rates have been used by several scholars as a measure of Chapter 11 success. For 
example, Professors LoPucki and Doherty have used recidivism rates as one metric by which to 
explore whether New York and Delaware reorganizations fail more often, and find that the 
generally quicker Delaware Chapter 11s are more likely to fail.79  Also, in his recent article, 
Revisiting the Recidivism- Chapter 11 Phenomenon in the U.S. Bankruptcy System,80 Edward 
Altman identifies repeated filings as a problem of the current Chapter 11 system and proposes 
the use of distress prediction techniques to help courts assess the feasibility of a reorganization 
plan.   
Indeed, a company that hastily emerges from its Chapter 11 proceedings without having 
addressed its operational and structural problems is most likely headed to another bankruptcy 
filing in the near future. Since, therefore, the 2005 amendments are positively correlated with 
short and preplanned Chapter 11 cases, the question that arises is whether the “successful” post-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Michael Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 35 (1989). 
79 See supra note 42, at 1939.  
80 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 253 (2014). 
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BAPCPA emergences are only temporarily successful, as another bankruptcy filing awaits 
around the corner.  
In order to examine this hypothesis, the same sample of companies drawn from the BRD, 
and processed as mentioned above,81 was used to examine BAPCPA’s effect on the debtors’ 
refiling rates. In particular, the sample consists once again of companies for which financial data 
for the last or second-to-last fiscal year were available in Compustat, after having excluded 
companies that fall under Division H of the SIC, namely finance, insurance, and real estate 
companies.82  From the total of these 390 companies, those that were able to emerge from the 
Chapter 11 process were initially identified.83  For these companies, data regarding the debtors’ 
refilling rate were gathered from the BRD. A debtor company is considered to have refilled if it 
filed for bankruptcy within five years since its emergence.84 Therefore, the final sample 
consisted of a total of 233 companies that had met this five-year threshold and for which refiling 
data were available. Available post-emergence financial data, as well as data regarding the filing 
venue, were gathered from the BRD. 
As Table 6 shows, we observe that of the total number of companies of the sample that 
filed for Chapter 11 and emerged through the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, 48% 
refiled for bankruptcy within five years of their emergence in the post-BAPCPA era, while the 
corresponding proportion for the pre-BAPCPA period is 18%.  This increase was measured to be 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  In order also to see whether post-BAPCPA companies 
emerge with a worse financial profile than the pre-BAPCPA ones, something that would possibly 
justify the higher refiling rate observed after 2005, the companies’ post-emergence profitability 
and leverage ratios’ means were calculated. As shown, however, in Table 7 neither of the 
differences in the companies’ post-emergence financial profile for the periods before and after 
BAPCPA was statistically significant.  
In order to examine more rigorously BAPCPA’s effect on recidivism, the companies’ 
post-emergence profile along with the filing venue are controlled for in a multivariate regression 
model. The following two sections describe briefly the type of regression used as well as the 
dependent and independent variables included, and set forth the results of the study. 
 
b. Regression Model and Variable Selection 
As the dependent variable (“refiling”) is once again categorical, a logistic regression model 
is employed. 
The independent variables controlled for in this regression model are the categorical 
variables of BAPCPA, and filing venue. These categorical variables are briefly defined below: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See supra Part III (I) (i) (a). 
82 Once again § 363 sale cases were excluded. 
83 See BRD protocols. 
84 According to the BRD codification for this field, for companies for which this 5-year threshold is not met, the 
corresponding field is “pending”. Partial refilings, that is, refilings where a substantial part, but not clearly over half 
of the emerging company filed again for bankruptcy, are indicated in the BRD. Such “partial refilings” were 
excluded from the regression model. Finally, not for every company refiling data were available.   
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• BAPCPA: the categorical variable of BAPCPA defined similarly as before. Namely, this 
variable takes the value 1 if a company filed for Chapter 11 on or after BAPCPA’s 
effective date, and 0 otherwise. 
 
• Filing Venue: similarly with above, this variable is 1 if the filing venue was Delaware, 
and 0 otherwise. As it has already been discussed, Delaware cases tend to be resolved 
much faster compared to other jurisdictions, and according to previous research, such a 
speedy Chapter 11 resolution increases the likelihood of the company’s refiling in the 
near future.85  
Post-emergence profitability and leverage ratios are also taken into account, as the 
financial health of the new company could indicate the probability of another bankruptcy 
filing. More specifically, the EBIT-to-total assets (post-emergence), as well as the total 
liabilities-to-total assets (post-emergence) ratios are included in the regression model. 
	  
c. Results 
 Table 8 quantifies, among other things, the effect of BAPCPA, which is of main concern 
here, on refiling rates. 
 As the univariate analysis initially suggested, BAPCPA has a statistically significant 
effect on the debtors’ refiling rates.  Therefore, the upside of having shorter Chapter 11 cases in 
the post-amendments era is watered down by the fact that the debtor-company has a greater 
likelihood to succumb to another bankruptcy filing.  Indeed, in order for Chapter 11 to be able to 
fulfill its traditional goal, that of rehabilitation of the business, then the debtor should have 
enough time to address the operational and other problems in order to emerge from its Chapter 
11 a truly stronger company.  And if one measure for successful bankruptcies is their refiling 
rate, then BAPCPA seems to have failed in this respect.  
Furthermore, the sign of the coefficient of the “filing venue” variable suggests that 
companies that reorganize in Delaware, are more likely to refile, however this variable is not 
statistically significant.86 The same holds for companies emerging with a higher profitability 
ratio, or a lower leverage ratio. In particular, the sign of the coefficient of the EBIT-to-total 
assets ratio indicates that the higher the post-emergence profitability of the company is, the less 
likely it is to file for bankruptcy again. Additionally, and as Table 8 shows, the less leveraged the 
company is the less risk it is for it to refile.  These results are consistent with Professor Altman’s 
study that found that both the post-emergence profitability and leverage of the company, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BANKRUPTCY CASES IS CORRUPTING THE 
BANKRUPTCY COURTS, University of Michigan Press (2006). Based on the results of this study, Professor LoPucki 
accuses Delaware of administering inefficient reorganizations, 
86 In a study of refiling rates between 1997 and 2004, it was shown that Delaware failure rates were similar to the 
failure rates of other jurisdictions (see Ruth Sarah Lee, Delaware’s Relevance in Chapter 22: Who Is “Courting 
Failure” Now?, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 443 (2011)).   
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measured by the EBIT-to-total assets and equity-to-total liabilities ratios respectively, were 
worse for companies that had refiled for bankruptcy than those that had not.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  IV. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The aforementioned studies showed a statistically significant correlation between 
BAPCPA and shorter Chapter 11 cases, as well as between BAPCPA and the increased use of 
prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies. Quick Chapter 11 cases are tempting, as the debtor 
incurs lower bankruptcy costs and is able to return to its normal operations faster.  Nevertheless, 
the question finally begged is, in what shape does the debtor really exit bankruptcy?  Contrary to 
what was happening in the past where the distressed company would enter Chapter 11 and stay 
there as long as necessary to sort out its financial affairs and effectuate an operational 
restructuring, now companies rush out of bankruptcy having merely reduced their debt without 
addressing core operational issues. BAPCPA seems to have only exacerbated this trend, as 
evidenced by the fact that a positive and statistically significant relationship was observed 
between the 2005 Act enactment and the debtors’ refiling rates.  Therefore, while speedy and 
low-cost bankruptcies are a positive development, one cannot ignore the risk of a repeated filing 
associated with them. 
 Within this context, a further question to be examined would be whether § 363-sale cases 
tend to be resolved more quickly as well in the post-BAPCPA period, and how has this new 
timeframe affected the sale prices. Given the fact that now creditors can submit competing plans 
much sooner compared to the pre-BAPCPA regime, which usually provide for the sale or 
liquidation of the debtor, it is expected that fewer days will come between the filing event and 
the entry of a sale order. This shortened timeframe can hypothetically operate to affect § 363-sale 
prices in two opposite directions. In particular, one might expect that a quick and hasty § 363 
sale will force the debtor to accept a depressed sale price. On the other hand, however, a quick 
sale reduces the risk of the assets deteriorating in value, a danger that exists in a lengthier 
proceeding. 
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TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Two-Tail T-test for Duration Means Before and After BAPCPA 
 
Two-tail t-test comparing the means in duration (measured in days) before and after the enactment of 
BAPCPA.  All relevant data were gathered from the BRD.   
 Duration for Traditional 
Chapter 11s 
Duration for Prepackaged and 
Prenegotiated Cases 
 Pre-BAPCPA        Post-BAPCPA Pre-BAPCPA        Post-BAPCPA 
   
Number of Observations 179 48 98 65 
   
Mean (days) 634 430 198 137 
   
t-stat 2.95 1.89 
   
P-value 0.0035 0.06 
   
t-critical 1.97 1.97 
Traditional Chapter 11s column: Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Prepackaged & Prenegotiated Cases column: Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2 
Two-Tail T-tests for Duration Means Before and After BAPCPA 
Two-tail t-test comparing the means in duration (measured in days) before and after the enactment of 
BAPCPA.  All relevant data were gathered from the BRD.   
 Duration for Total Sample (including prepackaged and prenegotiated 
cases) 
 Pre-BAPCPA                                                  Post-BAPCPA 
  
Number of Observations               277                                 113 
  
Mean (days)                   480                                                            261 
  
t-stat 4.903 
  
P value 1.38773E-06 
  
t-critical   1.97 
Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3 
Two-Tail T-tests for Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Cases Before and After BAPCPA 
Two-tail t-test comparing the proportions in prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies, before and after 
the enactment of BAPCPA.  All relevant data were gathered from the BRD.   
 Prepackaged & Prenegotiated Cases 
 Pre-BAPCPA                                                  Post-BAPCPA 
  
Number of Observations               277                                 113 
   
Number of Prepacks & 
Prenegotiated Cases 
           98                                   65 
  
Proportion                   0.35                                                            0.58 
  
t-stat -4.098 
  
P value 5.08609E-05 
  
t-critical   1.966 
Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Effect of BAPCPA on Duration of Chapter 11 Cases 
Financial data correspond to the last fiscal year before bankruptcy. If such data are not available, 
then they correspond to the second-to-last fiscal year before bankruptcy. All financial data were 
drawn from Compustat. The “firm size” variable, calculated as the logarithm of the book value of the 
firm’s total assets, is used as a proxy for case complexity.  Data regarding the type of case, i.e. 
whether it was a prepackaged or prenegotiated reorganization, as well as data regarding the filing 
venue were drawn from the BRD. 
 Coefficient P-value 
   
Constant 112.813 
 
38% 
   
BAPCPA  -180.299 
 
0%*** 
   
Economic Recession 50.658 
 
29% 
Total Assets / Total Liabilities -8.212 
 
86% 
 
Current Assets / Current 
Liabilities 
 
                     
                    27.459                                               18% 
                                                                                           
 
EBIT / Total Assets                     167.632                                              3%** 
 
 
Prepacks 
                     
                  
                   -369.876                                              0%*** 
                                                                                  
 
Firm Size 
 
160.278 
 
    
       0%*** 
 
Filing Venue  
 
41.906 
 
 
   26% 
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*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Effect of BAPCPA on Prepackaged & Prenegotiated Chapter 11 Cases  
Financial data correspond to the last fiscal year before bankruptcy. If such data are not available, then 
they correspond to the second-to-last fiscal year before bankruptcy.  All financial data were drawn 
from Compustat. The “firm size” variable, calculated as the logarithm of the book value of the firm’s 
total assets, is used as a proxy for case complexity. Data regarding the dependent variable 
“prepackaged and prenegotiated” cases, as well as data regarding the “filing venue” variable, were 
drawn from the BRD.  
 Coefficient P-value 
   
Constant 3.09 0.02% 
   
BAPCPA  0.9         0.04%*** 
   
Filing Venue 
0.09 70% 
   
Total Assets / Total Liabilities -1.47      0%*** 
 
Current Assets / Current 
Liabilities 
 
-0.065                                               63% 
EBIT / Assets 
 0.514                                                33% 
Firm Size                                                                -0.7                                                   1%*** 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
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Table 6 
Two-Tail T-test Comparing Refiling Rates Before and After BAPCPA 
Two-tail t-test comparing the proportions in refiling rates before and after the enactment of BAPCPA. 
Relevant data were gathered from the BRD.  A company is considered to have refilled, if it filed for 
bankruptcy within 5 years since its emergence from its previous bankruptcy. 
                                       Refiling 
     Pre-BAPCPA                                              Post-BAPCPA 
  
Number of Observations 208 25 
  
Proportion 0.18 0.48 
  
t-stat                                             -3.583 
  
P value                                              0.0004 
  
t-critical                                                 1.97 
Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 7 
Two-Tail T-test Comparing the Debtors’ Post-Emergence Financial Profile Before and After 
BAPCPA 
 
Two-tail t-test comparing the post-emergence profitability and leverage ratios means (EBIT-to-total 
assets, and total liabilities-to-total assets respectively) for the periods before and after the enactment of 
BAPCPA. Financial data were gathered from the BRD.   
 EBIT / Total Assets (post-
emergence) 
Total Liabilities –to-Total 
Assets (post-emergence) 
 Pre-BAPCPA        Post-BAPCPA               Pre-BAPCPA      Post-BAPCPA 
   
Number of Observations 118 9    129     10 
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Mean        -0.007 -0.016 0.758 0.877 
   
t-stat 0.2 -1.145 
   
P-value 0.84 0.25 
   
t-critical 1.979 1.977 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Effect of BAPCPA on Debtors’ Refiling Rates 
Relevant data were drawn from the BRD. A debtor is considered to have refilled, if it filed for bankruptcy 
within 5 years since its emergence. 
 Coefficient P-Value 
   
Constant -2.66 0% 
   
BAPCPA 3.473       0%*** 
   
Filing Venue 0.645                        15% 
   
EBIT / Total Assets (post 
emergence) 
-1.163 48% 
   
Total Liabilities / Total Assets 
(post emergence) 
1.042 15% 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
 
	  
